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Abstract 
Drawing on a comparative framework, this paper analyses to what extent and how 
the institutional reforms of the Treaty of Lisbon impacted on the ‘actorness’ and 
effectiveness of the European Union (EU) with regard to the negotiation of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements. In order to examine whether the Lisbon Treaty was really 
a game changer, the paper compares two case studies before and two case studies 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in the fields of climate change 
(Copenhagen COP-15 2009 and COP-21 Paris 2015) and biological diversity 
(Cartagena Protocol 2000 and Nagoya Protocol 2010). The paper finds significant 
variation across the four cases, with no clear improvement after the Lisbon Treaty but 
a more effective EU in the biodiversity regime compared to climate change. The case 
studies show that the EU’s performance in international environmental negotiations 
mainly depends on the external context and not on the EU’s internal institutional set-
up and external representation. Moreover, the climate change regime cannot be 
seen as the archetypal case of environmental governance, which is why environ-
mental policy fields other than climate change should receive more academic 
attention. 
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Introduction: Has the Lisbon Treaty made the EU more effective on the 
international stage? 
“A lot of Europeans in the room is not a problem, but there is only an advantage if we 
sing from the same hymn sheet. We need to think about this and reflect on this very 
seriously, or we will lose our leadership role in the world.”1 This statement by Climate 
Commissioner Hedegaard was emblematic for the criticism of the performance of the 
European Union (EU)2 at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit (COP-15). The EU did 
not manage to play a significant role during that summit and Hedegaard linked the 
EU’s lack of goal achievement, or ‘effectiveness’, to its internal institutional set-up and 
the resulting external representation.3 In doing so, she drew on a line of thought that 
connects the EU’s political system to its ability to act externally, or ‘actorness’, based 
on the assumption that stronger EU actorness will translate into more effectiveness. As 
such, a unified EU – or in Hedegaard’s words, ‘singing from the same hymn sheet’ – is 
sufficient to speak of an effective EU, no matter to what extent the EU’s policy 
objectives have in fact been attained.4 The same reasoning was behind the reform of 
external representation brought about with the Lisbon Treaty, which attempted to 
strengthen the EU’s actorness by strengthening its cohesion.5 Recent studies have cast 
doubts on this alleged correlation and have searched for alternative explanations for 
EU effectiveness or the lack thereof.6 However, the linkage between the concepts 
remains empirically underexplored in academic research.7  
                                                 
1 L. Phillips, “Hedegaard: EU must speak with one voice on climate”, EUObserver, 15 January 
2010. 
2 The European Union refers to the post-Lisbon European Union, but also its predecessors, the 
European Economic Community, the European Community and the European Union as 
established by the Maastricht Treaty. 
3 L. Groen & A. Niemann, “The European Union at the Copenhagen climate negotiations: A 
case of contested EU actorness and effectiveness”, International Relations, vol. 27, no. 3, 2013, 
pp. 309. 
4 E. da Conceição-Heldt & S. Meunier, “Speaking with a single voice: Internal cohesiveness and 
external effectiveness of the EU in global governance”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 
21, no. 7, 2014, pp. 961-962. 
5 T. Corthaut & D. Van Eeckhoutte, “Legal aspects of EU participation in global environmental 
governance under the UN umbrella”, in J. Wouters, H. Bruyninckx, S. Basu & S. Schunz (eds.), The 
European Union and multilateral governance: Assessing EU participation in United Nations 
human rights and environmental fora, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 146-154. 
6  da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, op. cit., pp. 961-963; S. Oberthür & L. Groen, “The 
effectiveness dimension of the EU’s performance in international institutions: Toward a more 
comprehensive assessment framework”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 53, no. 6, 
2015, pp. 1323-1325; S. Oberthür & F. Rabitz, “On the EU’s performance and leadership in global 
environmental governance: the case of the Nagoya Protocol”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, vol. 21, no. 1, 2013, pp. 40-44. 
7  E. Drieskens, “Golden or gilded jubilee? A research agenda for actorness“, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 24, no. 10, 2017, pp. 1540-1543. 
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This paper investigates to what extent and how the Lisbon Treaty has 
strengthened the EU’s actorness as well as its effectiveness in the area of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEA). It carries out a comparative analysis of four cases 
in the domains of biodiversity and climate change and analyses whether the Lisbon 
Treaty was really a game changer when it comes to the EU’s performance in MEA 
negotiations. The EU’s actorness is discussed after aggregating its ‘opportunity’, 
‘presence’ and ‘capability’. ‘Opportunity’ focuses on the external context, ‘presence’ 
on the EU’s internal legislation and ‘capability’ on the EU’s institutional set-up. The 
paper argues that the Lisbon Treaty did not significantly strengthen either the EU’s 
actorness or its effectiveness. Indeed, the external context, as shown in the 
‘opportunity’ component of actorness, provides the largest explanatory power for the 
EU’s effectiveness and the Lisbon Treaty did not have an impact on that. 
Consequently, actorness can only be a useful tool to study effectiveness if the external 
context is duly taken into account, meaning that the ‘opportunity’ variable has to be 
given sufficient weight in the analysis. 
The selection of case studies is, first of all, driven by their impact on the planet. 
According to Steffen et al., climate change and biodiversity are among the most 
progressed environmental dangers and the public has become increasingly aware of 
them.8 Second, several MEAs have been agreed upon in the fields of biodiversity and 
climate change allowing for a comparison between the pre- and post-Lisbon period.9 
For each time period, one case study focuses on the field of biodiversity and the other 
on climate governance. The four cases are: the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; 
the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in 2009; the 2010 Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilisation; and the 21st COP (COP-21) to the UNFCCC in Paris 
in 2015.  
The two policy fields are very different with regard to both the EU’s internal 
policies in place as well as the international regimes dealing with these areas. This 
                                                 
8  W. Steffen et al., “Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing 
planet”, Science, vol. 347, no. 6223, 2015, pp. 1286-1287. 
9 While this would also hold for the field of chemicals, the post-Lisbon Minamata Convention on 
Mercury resulted in a standoff between the EU institutions, which were trying to taking 
advantage of their newly gained powers. This resulted in a hostile relationship between the 
different institutions and complicated the EU’s negotiation position, a situation which is not 
necessarily representative for a normal negotiation context. See Corthaut & Van Eeckhoutte, 
op. cit., pp. 157-160. 
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allows for a comprehensive comparison across two different fields of global 
environmental governance, and to study how the link between the EU’s actorness and 
its effectiveness plays out in different contexts. Conclusions can therefore also be 
drawn on whether climate change is indeed the most representative example in the 
field of environmental governance, as is often assumed.10  
The next section introduces the concepts of actorness and effectiveness and 
operationalises them. The third section applies the analytical framework to the four 
case studies, based on which the conclusions are drawn.  
 
Conceptual framework: Using actorness to study the EU’s effectiveness in 
multilateral environmental negotiations 
Research on EU foreign policy generally finds significant differences between policy 
areas and periods when it comes to the EU’s ability to “behave actively and 
deliberately in relations to other actors in the international system”, or actorness.11 A 
first wave of academic literature tries to explain these differences by – sometimes 
implicitly – linking the EU’s institutional set-up to its international actorness. In this body 
of literature, actorness tends to be considered as being the same as effectiveness, 
while others see the former as a precondition for the latter. What is problematic is that 
varying levels of actorness and effectiveness have been observed across policy fields, 
seemingly unrelated to the different decision-making procedures in place. 12 As a 
result, a second wave of more recent literature has distinguished these notions and 
has also looked at external factors to explain varying measures of effectiveness.13  
The Lisbon Treaty aimed to increase the EU’s internal cohesion and actorness, 
and consequently, as often argued by policy makers, its effectiveness as well.14 This 
                                                 
10 Keukeleire & Delreux, op. cit., p. 230. 
11 G. Sjösted, The external role of the European Community, London, Gower Publishing House, 
1977, p. 17. 
12 da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, op. cit., pp. 961-962; Drieskens, op. cit., pp. 1538-1540; M.L.P. 
Groenleer & L.G. Van Schaik, “United we stand? The European Union’s international actorness 
in the cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 45, no. 5, 2007, pp. 969-972. 
13 da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, op. cit., pp. 961-962; Oberthür & Groen, “The effectiveness 
dimension of the EU’s performance in international institutions”, op. cit., pp. 1321-1325; Oberthür 
& Rabitz, op. cit., pp. 40-44; S. Schunz, European Union foreign policy and the global climate 
regime, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2014, pp. 301-309. 
14 Corthaut & Van Eeckhoutte, op. cit., pp. 146-154. 
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makes the discussion on the linkage between both concepts again relevant, 
particularly in light of the need for more systematic research.15  
Bretherton and Vogler define actorness as “an entity [exhibiting] a degree of 
autonomy from its external environment [as well as] from its internal constituents, and 
which is capable of volition or purpose”. 16 As a consequence, this entity should be 
“capable of formulating purposes and making decisions, and thus engaging in some 
form of purposive action”.17 They operationalise actorness by using the variables of 
‘opportunity’, ‘presence’ and ‘capability’, which are further discussed below, and 
which are then applied to the case studies by using a three-level scale of ‘low’, 
‘medium’ and ‘high’. The score accorded depends on the evaluation of the different 
criteria discussed below and as shown in Table 1 below.18 The changes introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty potentially have an effect on the EU’s internal legal and institutional 
context, which is reflected in the ‘capability’ variable. However, they cannot influence 
the external context, such as the position of other key countries. Hence, the 
‘opportunity’ variable is not directly influenced by the Lisbon Treaty.19 
The ‘opportunity’ variable “denotes factors in the external environment of ideas 
and events which constrain or enable actorness”.20 Due to growing interdependence 
and globalisation, the EU’s actions on the international stage are increasingly shaped 
by the external environment. Moreover, individual nations are more and more seen as 
incapable of dealing with some of today’s major problems, leading to an 
‘opportunity’ for regional organisations, such as the EU, to act. The indicators for 
‘opportunity’ are related to the specificities of the climate change and biodiversity 
regimes, the EU’s position in these regimes and the position of other key players. As set 
out in Table 1, the bigger the EU’s role as a key player and the more its position is 
conservative or moderate compared to other countries, the higher its ‘opportunity’. 
                                                 
15 Drieskens, op. cit., 1541-1543; S. Keukeleire & T. Delreux, The foreign policy of the European 
Union, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 2nd edn., p. 228. 
16 C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, The European Union as a global actor, London, Routledge, 2006, 
2nd edn., pp. 16-17. 
17 Ibid. 
18  See also S. Schunz, C. Damro & S. Gstöhl, “Analytical framework: Understanding and 
explaining EU external engagement”, in C. Damro, S. Gstöhl & S. Schunz (eds.), The European 
Union’s evolving external engagement: Towards sectoral diplomacies?, Abingdon, Routledge, 
forthcoming. 
19 Ibid., pp. 12-61; see also J. Jupille & J.A. Caporaso, “States, agency and rules: The European 
Union in global environmental politics”, in C. Rhodes (ed.), The European in the world 
community, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 213-229. 
20 Bretherton & Vogler, op. cit., p. 24. 
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Conversely, EU ‘opportunity’ is more limited the less the EU is a key player and the more 
its position is reformist.21  
 
Table 1: Operationalising actorness 
Variable Level Indicator  
 High (H) 
EU position easy to defend (conservative or moderate 
compared to other countries) and the EU is a key player in 
the international regime. 
Opportunity Medium (M) 
EU has a moderate or conservative position that is easy to 
defend but is not a key player.  
EU has a difficult, reformist position but is a key player.  
 Low (L) EU has a difficult, reformist position and is not a key player. 
 High (H) 
Internal EU legislation is progressive and has a broad 
scope, and the EU has an important share of the global 
market. 
Presence Medium (M) 
EU internal legislation is progressive, but the EU has only a 
limited share of the global market. 
Limited internal EU legislation exists or the legislation is 
comparable to other countries, but the EU has an 
important share of the global market. 
 Low (L) Limited internal EU legislation exists and the EU only has a limited share of the global market. 
 High (H) 
Relevant and clear EU Treaty objectives and clear division 
of competences, and unified decision-making and 
external representation. 
Capability Medium (M) 
Relevant and clear EU Treaty objectives, but divided 
decision-making and/or external representation. 
No relevant EU Treaty objectives, but unified decision-
making and external representation. 
 Low (L) No relevant EU Treaty objectives and divided decision-making and external representation. 
Source: compiled by author, based on Bretherton & Vogler, op. cit., pp. 12-61. 
 
The second component of actorness is ‘presence’, which “conceptualizes the ability 
of the EU, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders”.22 Thanks to 
its large market size, EU legislation can have extraterritorial effects. Other countries can 
look at the EU’s legislation and choose to align their own laws with the EU’s rules, based 
on a cost-benefit calculation or normative convictions. This allows companies to 
compete on their market without having to make large investments in order to comply 
with a different set of rules.23 If the EU adopts more ambitious rules compared to other 
                                                 
21 Ibid., pp. 24-27. 
22 Bretherton & Vogler, op. cit., p. 24. 
23 C. Damro, “Market power Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 19, no. 5, 2012, p. 
687. 
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countries, this can even lead to a so-called ‘race to the top’. Foreign companies 
active on the EU market also have to follow EU rules, and they have to make 
investments in order to comply with EU rules. As a result, they may lobby other 
governments to adopt legislation that is similar to the higher EU standards. 
Consequently, they avoid the investments that would come with adapting to different 
standards on different markets.24 The EU’s ‘presence’ is therefore higher, the more 
extensive the EU’s internal legislation and the more important the EU’s share of the 
global market. Foreign actors are more likely to follow and learn from the EU’s 
example, whether or not on normative grounds, if the EU has built up a certain 
expertise and legitimacy in the matter. Moreover, legislation is more likely to have 
extrajudicial effect, whether or not intended, if the EU holds an important share of the 
global market. As shown in Table 1, the more limited the EU’s share of the global market 
or its internal legislation, the lower its ‘presence’ is.25 
The third component of actorness is ‘capability’ which “refers to the internal 
context of EU external action [such as] the availability of policy instruments […] and 
the Union’s ability to utilize these instruments, in response to opportunity and/or to 
capitalize on presence”.26 This includes the nature of the EU’s legal competence, 
which can be found in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as well as their predecessors. Also, the 
objectives written in the Treaties and other policy documents allow to derive what the 
EU seeks to achieve with its external action, as well as the decision-making procedures 
and external representation. As summarised in Table 1, the more relevant the EU’s 
Treaty objectives are to the matter being discussed and the more unified the EU’s 
external representation and decision-making, the higher the EU’s ‘capability’. 
Conversely, the EU’s representation and decision-making process is divided and the 
less relevant EU Treaty objectives, the lower its ‘capability’.27 
The three variables are given equal weight when aggregated for determining 
the overall actorness of the EU. As such, the overall level of actorness reflects the level 
of the majority of the variables. 
The Lisbon Treaty introduced several changes to the EU’s  institutional set-up, as 
reflected in the ‘capability’ variable. There can also be consequences for the EU’s 
                                                 
24  K. Biedenkopf, “Policy diffusion”, in J.-F. Morin (ed.), Essential concepts of global 
environmental governance, London, Routledge, 2015, pp. 152-153. 
25 Bretherton & Vogler, op. cit., pp. 27-29. 
26 Ibid., p. 24. 
27 Bretherton & Vogler, op. cit., p. 29-35; Jupille & Caporaso, op. cit., pp. 216-217. 
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‘presence’, considering the fact that the Lisbon Treaty was supposed to facilitate the 
adoption of internal rules. Indeed, if the EU’s internal decision-making process is easier, 
then more legislation can be adopted, leading to a larger scope of applicable EU 
regulations and a higher chance of external effects. However, the implementation of 
the Lisbon Treaty does not have any influence on the international negotiation 
context. Nevertheless, (indirect) changes in ‘capability’ and ‘presence’ can of course 
affect the way in which the EU capitalises on ‘opportunity’. Furthermore, the global 
institutional context can have an impact on the way the EU can make use of its 
‘capability’. For example, member states still represent the EU in the International 
Labour Organisation, even with regard to EU competences, as only states can 
become full members.28 However, this is not the case in the field of MEA negotiations.  
For the purposes of this paper, and as shown in Table 2, the dependent variable 
of the EU’s effectiveness is defined as “the extent to which the EU reaches the main 
goals of its position in the results of international negotiations”.29 Effectiveness is thus 
understood as goal achievement. While actorness focuses on the input side of the EU’s 
engagement on the international stage, effectiveness looks at the output, namely to 
what extent the EU is able to realise the policy objectives that it has set out in advance. 
For this reason, the EU’s policy documents outlining its position on the negotiations will 
be compared to the final negotiation outcome. As shown in Table 2, the closer the 
final outcome of the negotiations to the EU’s position, the higher the EU’s 
effectiveness.30   
As van Schaik argues, the EU’s viewpoint as reflected in official, public 
documents indeed resembles its actual stance during the negotiations.31 Due to the 
difficulty to agree internally on a common position between the member states and 
EU institutions, there is little room for derogation from the official mandate even at the 
height of the deliberations or when it would be appropriate from a strategic point of 
view. It does bring the advantage, however, that the EU’s position is rather stable and 
that it can be easily identified through the use of publicly available information. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 European Court of Justice, Opinion 2/91, ILO Chemicals Convention, 1993, ECR I-1063. 
29 L.G. van Schaik, EU effectiveness and unity in multilateral negotiations: More than the sum of 
its parts?, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 35. 
30 Groen & Niemann, op. cit., pp. 317-318. 
31 van Schaik, op. cit., pp. 35-37. 
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Table 2: Operationalising effectiveness 
Variable Level Indicator 
Effectiveness High (H) 
The final outcome of the negotiations largely resembles 
the EU’s position, with only minor concessions on the EU’s 
side. 
Medium (M) 
The final outcome of the negotiations resembles the EU’s 
position on some points, but some major concessions have 
been made. 
Low (L) The final outcome is very different from the EU’s position. 
Source: compiled by author, based on van Schaik, op. cit., p. 35. 
 
The following section deals with the pre-Lisbon negotiations in Cartagena and in 
Copenhagen. 
 
The pre-Lisbon cases of Cartagena and Copenhagen 
Environmental management was introduced as a shared competence at the EU level 
by the Single European Act. With the Treaty of Amsterdam, environmental protection 
became an overarching policy objective to be integrated in all policy domains and 
with particular attention to the precautionary principle. This meant that the EU had to 
act based on the assumption that danger can exist if no sufficient scientific evidence 
was available regarding environmental risks. Internal legislation was adopted by a 
qualified majority in the Council, with the consent of the European Parliament. 
Following the European Court of Justice’s so-called European Railroads Transport 
Agreement (ERTA) judgement, the EU has been deemed competent to act 
internationally if EU-level internal policy is already in place.32 
Nevertheless, EU internal legislation is not yet in place in all environmental areas 
and the EU is not always competent to legislate, for instance regarding climate 
financing. As a result, MEA negotiations often involve(d) a mix of EU and member state 
competences, leading to ‘mixed agreements’. In practice, decision-making in the 
Council regarding MEAs is thus often based on unanimity, with the European 
Parliament only having advisory powers. Theoretically, the Commission represented 
the EU externally regarding EU-level competences and the Council Presidency for 
national ones. In practice, a division between different types of competences was 
                                                 
32 Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), 1971, ECR 264; European Union, “Consolidated 
version of the Treaty establishing the European Community”, Official Journal of the European 
Union, C340, 10 November 1997, arts. 6, 137, 174-176, 251, 300 (hereafter: TEC Amsterdam 
Treaty).  
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hardly possible, usually leading to the creation of an informal EU team consisting of 
Commission, Council Presidency and member-state officials.33 
 
The Cartagena Protocol: An effective EU despite internal division 
The Cartagena Protocol was negotiated around the turn of the century as part of the 
framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to deal with the use of 
genetically modified organisms (GMO). It aimed to balance economic interests with 
health and environmental concerns. 34  Many other frameworks also touch upon 
biosafety and GMOs, such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), but the CBD nevertheless remains the main 
overarching institutional set-up dealing with the issue.35 Both the EU and its individual 
member states are parties to this Convention. The relationship between the 
Cartagena Protocol and the WTO framework was heavily debated between countries 
with an important GMO industry and developing countries, with the EU’s position 
gradually moving towards the latter. The same cleavage existed regarding the scope 
of the agreement and the inclusion of the precautionary principle, where the EU 
backed the developing nations.36 Together with the absence of the US as an official 
party, this resulted in a complex international set-up. Nevertheless, the EU was able to 
act as a bridge-builder, as a result of its intermediate position in the negotiations.37 
Consequently, the EU’s ‘opportunity’ can be rated as high. 
The Commission’s efforts to harmonise biotechnology regulation only proved 
successful in connection with the internal market. The EU rules were based on the 
precautionary principle, that is, GMOs were considered dangerous until proven 
otherwise. Consequently, they were much stricter than the national rules they had 
replaced or the rules in place in other countries. EU GMO regulation was new but 
comprehensive. For example, it required companies to do research regarding 
                                                 
33 T. Delreux, “The EU in negotiations on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety”, in J. Wouters, H. 
Bruyninckx, S. Basu & S. Schunz (eds.), The European Union and multilateral governance: 
Assessing EU participation in United Nations human rights and environmental fora, London, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 222-223. 
34 A. Cosbey & S. Burgiel, “The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An analysis of results”, IISD 
Briefing Note, Winnipeg, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2000, pp. 3-9. 
35 K. Rosendal, “Global biodiversity governance”, in R.S. Axelrod & S.D. VanDeveer (eds.), The 
global environment: Institutions, law and policy, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2015, 4th edn., pp. 286-
288. 
36 R. Falkner, “The political economy of ‘normative power’ Europe: EU environmental leadership 
in international biotechnology regulation”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 14, no. 4, 
2007, pp. 514-516. 
37 Cosbey & Burgiel, op. cit., pp. 3-9. 
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potentially harmful effects of their products, which could then be used by other 
countries as well. The EU’s far-reaching GMO legislation served as a blueprint for 
several countries, particularly those willing to adopt the precautionary principle. 
However, the EU’s well-developed internal legislation also had a significant downside. 
After adopting the precautionary principle internally, the EU could not ignore 
demands of developing countries for an international agreement based on the same 
principle.38 This constraint was quite significant, as some EU member states were not in 
favour of including this principle in such an international agreement. 39  The EU’s 
‘presence’ can therefore be rated as medium. 
Due to the mixed nature of the agreement, the Cartagena Protocol had to go 
through the national ratification procedure of every EU member state. Hence, 
unanimity was required among the EU member states, and disagreement in the 
Council initially lead to a very vague negotiation mandate. However, after several 
food scandals and the installation of new governments in key member states like 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom, the positions converged significantly.40 
Additionally, as the negotiations progressed, the (symbolic) ‘cost of no agreement’ 
became relatively high. Consequently, a consensus in the Council was found rather 
easily in the final stages of the negotiations. The member states and particularly the 
Council Presidency usually took a leading role in negotiations within the CBD 
framework, but due to the existence of a trade component, the Commission wanted 
to be the sole negotiator. This disagreement at first lead to an unworkable, formal 
negotiation arrangement. A list of topics discussed during the negotiations was 
drafted, and for each topic it was agreed whether the Commission or the Council 
Presidency would be the lead negotiator. However, once the member states’ positions 
converged, the representation efforts moved towards a well-functioning, informal EU 
team consisting of Commission, Council Presidency and national experts.41 Overall, 
the EU’s ‘capability’ can therefore be rated as medium. 
With high ‘opportunity’ and medium levels of ‘presence’ and ‘capability’, the 
EU’s overall actorness with regard to the Cartagena Protocol can be gauged as 
medium. The main factors contributing to this assessment are the EU’s far-reaching 
internal GMO legislation that served as a blueprint for other countries and the informal 
negotiating arrangement between the Commission, Council Presidency and member 
                                                 
38 Falkner, op. cit., pp. 514-516. 
39 Delreux, “EU in negotiations on the Cartagena Protocol”, op. cit., pp. 222-227. 
40 Ibid., pp. 224-225. 
41 Ibid., pp. 219-224. 
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state experts. By contrast, the complicated internal decision-making process and the 
initially divergent opinions between member states constrained the EU’s actorness. 
The EU’s effectiveness in the negotiations can be assessed as high because key 
EU positions such as the application of the Protocol to a wide scope of GMOs were 
reflected in the final outcome.42 Delreux links this high level of effectiveness to the EU’s 
increased level of actorness in the final round of the negotiations. Particularly the 
increased cohesion due to the convergence in member states’ positions is seen as an 
important factor. However, while the EU’s medium actorness certainly contributed to 
establishing the Union as an effective player, one should not forget that this level of 
actorness was not the result of institutional changes. Rather, it was caused by simple 
politics, such as government changes and the fallout of food scandals. 43 Moreover, 
domestic politics are not the only explanatory factor for the EU’s high level of 
effectiveness. The EU managed to limit the scope of the negotiations to a policy that 
was already in place internally, meaning that the cost of agreeing to the treaty was 
relatively low.44 The reason it could do so can be explained by the absence of the US 
as an official party, which made the EU an important negotiation partner, and by the 
EU’s intermediate position between GMO producers and developing countries.45 In 
this sense, the external context, as reflected in the ‘opportunity’ variable of actorness, 
provides more explanatory power than the variables focusing on the internal aspects 
of the EU, such as ‘capability’. 
 
A divided EU side-lined during the Copenhagen climate negotiations 
The main goal at COP-15 in Copenhagen was to agree on a successor for the Kyoto 
Protocol, in order to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions after 2012 and to 
arrange for climate financing and adaptation measures. The EU envisaged an 
ambitious agreement and took on a reformist position, contrary to Brazil, South Africa, 
India and China (‘BASIC’) as well as the US. The BASIC countries wanted industrialised 
countries to take the lead, a principle that was followed in the Kyoto Protocol, while 
the US wanted emerging countries to also participate in the mitigation effort. 
Additionally, President Obama was constrained by domestic politics, leading the US 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p. 222. 
43 Ibid.,  pp. 222-225. 
44 E.R. DeSombre, “Domestic sources of U.S. unilateralism”, in R.S. Axelrod & S.D. VanDeveer 
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to refuse to take on a real leadership role.46 Even though the global regime is relatively 
straightforward, with a clear focus on the UNFCCC, the EU’s ‘opportunity’ was 
significantly hurt by its outlier and pro-reform position. The EU’s ‘opportunity’ can 
therefore be rated as low. 
The EU had strengthened its internal climate regulation ahead of COP-15 to 
address the credibility gap between its ambitious international rhetoric and its rather 
conservative internal legislation. An important measure was the Emission Trading 
System (ETS), which forced companies active on the EU market to consider their 
environmental impact. It served as an example for several countries seeking to 
implement their own carbon pricing system.47 The EU also approved the 2020 targets, 
a comprehensive effort to reduce emissions that consisted of renewable energy, GHG 
emission reduction and energy efficiency targets. A long-term 2050 target was agreed 
upon, but not backed up by policy measures. 48  While these measures positively 
contributed to the EU’s actorness, they fell short of the level of ambition of the EU’s 
rhetoric, leading to a medium level of ‘presence’. 
No specific EU Treaty objectives on climate existed, but the precautionary 
principle required the EU to act based on the assumption that danger can exist if no 
sufficient scientific evidence was available regarding environmental risks, instead of 
waiting for full scientific evidence, which is the US approach. 49  Because climate 
negotiations involve both EU and member state competences, unanimity is required 
in the Council, with the European Parliament only being consulted.50 This was a high 
threshold because issues such as climate finance and the distribution of GHG emission 
reduction efforts split the ambitious and reluctant member states. These cleavages 
resurfaced during the high-level political COP-segment. Individual EU heads of state 
and government took over the lead of the negotiations, not respecting the traditional 
dual representation system of the Commission and the Council Presidency. Bigger 
                                                 
46 W. Obergassel et al., “Phoenix from the ashes – An analysis of the Paris Agreement to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, Wuppertal Institute for Climate, 
Environment and Energy, 1 March 2016, p. 8; L.G. van Schaik & S. Schunz, “Explaining EU 
activism and impact in global climate politics: Is the Union a norm- or interest-driven actor?”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 50, no. 1, 2012, pp. 181-182. 
47 D. Meadows, Y. Slingenberg & P. Zapfel, “EU ETS: Pricing carbon to drive cost-effective 
reductions across Europe”, in J. Delbeke & P. Vis (eds.), EU climate policy explained, Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2015, p. 30; Schunz, op. cit., p. 228. 
48 J. Delbeke & P. Vis, “EU climate leadership in a rapidly changing world”, in J. Delbeke & P. Vis 
(eds.), EU climate policy explained, Abingdon, Routledge, 2015, pp. 18-21. 
49 DeSombre, op. cit., pp. 138-143. 
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member states in particular started to defend their own interests, leading to a divided 
EU.51 As a result, the EU’s ‘capability’ can be rated as medium. 
With a low level of ‘opportunity’ and medium levels of ‘presence’ and 
‘capability’, the EU’s actorness at COP-15 was only medium. The EU’s internal 
legislation was well-developed and had clear external effects, but cleavages on 
important issues like climate finance were not solved in a sustainable way. This resulted 
in a lack of coherent EU positioning and representation during the final negotiations, 
when national interests started dominating as the talks became politicised. 
The Copenhagen Agreement was much less ambitious than what the EU had 
aimed for, and this low level of goal achievement, or effectiveness, is generally 
attributed to a low level of actorness.52 Nevertheless, other factors need to be taken 
into account, and the ‘opportunity’ variable actually provides the largest explanatory 
power. The EU was by far the most ambitious player among developed countries, while 
the US position was significantly held back by domestic opposition. For example, after 
a long discussion, the US had not managed to implement a domestic emission trading 
plan similar to the EU’s ETS. Moreover, it was clear that the US would not agree to the 
inclusion of binding emission reduction targets in the agreement since it would not 
obtain the required two-third majority in the US Senate.53 As a result, President Obama 
was unable to pressure the BASIC countries which were united in their desire to block 
an ambitious agreement.54 The reluctance of the US and the opposition of the BASIC 
countries in Copenhagen created a very challenging external environment. Due to 
the disunity between its member states, the EU was not able to effectively respond to 
this. The divergence in member state positions, the lack of a clear mandate and the 
incoherent representation prevented the EU from adjusting its position in the search for 
compromises with third countries. 
Overall, the two pre-Lisbon cases show that the EU was more successful in the 
biodiversity regime than in the one dealing with climate change because the 
international setting was more favourable in the former caser. The EU’s position was 
more moderate and the exclusion of the US from the negotiations made it a key 
player. The external factor, conceptualised in the ‘opportunity’ variable, indeed 
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seems to represent the crucial difference, as the internal context is largely the same 
for the two policy fields.  
The two post-Lisbon cases, discussed in the following section for the same policy 
fields, show a similar pattern. 
 
The post-Lisbon cases of Nagoya and Paris 
The Lisbon Treaty confirmed the EU’s commitment to environmental protection, the 
precautionary principle and ‘effective multilateralism’ and required it to be 
particularly active in MEA negotiations.55 As before, decision-making largely follows 
the ordinary legislative procedure.56 More significant is the adoption of the ordinary 
legislative procedure for environment-related competences such as transport and 
energy. This will make EU regulation easier due to the lower threshold for passing 
legislation in the Council.57 Following the ERTA principle, codified in article 3(2) TFEU, 
this can also have an impact on the external decision-making process.58 
Major changes were made to the Treaty provisions regarding the EU’s 
representation and the conclusion of international agreements. First, the European 
Parliament acquired the power to consent to international agreements, effectively 
becoming a veto player in MEA negotiations, which could also impact the negotiation 
process.59 Second, explicit references to the Council Presidency in relation to the EU’s 
external representation have been removed. Third, important changes include the 
new functions of the permanent President of the European Council and the High 
Representative (HR/VP) as well as the creation of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). These reforms were expected to increase the cohesion in the EU’s external 
representation and to positively contribute to the EU’s actorness. For example, the 
transformation of the Commission Delegations abroad to EU Delegations under the 
auspices of the EEAS and the HR/VP might allow to better tie environmental issues to 
‘high politics’, such as security, in a comprehensive diplomatic strategy.60 
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The Nagoya Protocol: Limited EU interest, but high effectiveness 
The 2010 Nagoya Protocol aims to address the discrepancy regarding the access and 
benefit of sharing genetic resources, which are mainly found in the South but largely 
used by companies in the North. Developing countries pushed for an ambitious, 
transparent and legally binding agreement covering a wide array of genetic 
resources, including those accessed in the past and derivatives that would have 
influenced international patent rules. Developed countries were opposed to these 
ideas and stressed the importance of economic freedom.61 Despite some overlap with 
the WTO and the FAO activities, the CBD framework was the main platform for the 
negotiations. 62  This meant that the US did not participate, resulting in 40% of 
biotechnology patents not being covered.63 This made the inclusion of the EU’s share 
of 30% all the more important for the Protocol to have any impact, and the EU 
therefore became a key player.64 Consequently, the EU actually benefitted from the 
complex global setting, and its ‘opportunity’ can thus be rated as high. 
 As mentioned above, the EU has an important share of the global market of 
biotechnology patents. However, its internal regulation was very limited and could 
therefore not have many extrajudicial effects. EU policy on genetic resources was 
mainly based on its strict GMO regulation and its patent legislation, with no laws 
specifically dealing with access and benefit sharing. The EU was thus not seen as a 
normative example in this area, and due to the limited legislation in place, there were 
few external effects.65 As a consequence, the EU’s ‘presence’ can be described as 
medium.  
 The Nagoya Protocol was adopted based on the EU’s Treaty objective to 
pursue a “prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources”, which only partly 
covers the scope of the Protocol.66 The unanimity requirement that was the result of 
the mixed nature of the agreement was unproblematic for both the European 
Parliament and the Council because the EU’s position in the negotiations was 
conservative. Gradually, the EU’s position became more moderate in order to achieve 
a diplomatic victory. The representation effort was complicated at first when the 
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Commission tried to expand its negotiation mandate in conjunction with the discussion 
on the Minamata Convention,67 but went more smoothly afterwards. The Commission 
was only allowed to negotiate on EU-affected competences, but this part was in 
practice rather extensive, as only the member state holding the Council Presidency 
took an interest in the negotiations. 68  Eventually, the negotiations caused limited 
problems for the EU, resulting in a medium ‘capability’.  
With a high level of ‘opportunity’, a medium ‘presence’ and a medium 
‘capability’, the EU’s overall actorness can be evaluated as medium. The main 
constraining factor was the lack of internal regulation. The regulation that did exist was 
not enough for the EU to differentiate itself from other industrialised countries and to 
set a normative example. Enabling factors were the EU’s powerful position due to the 
absence of the US as well as a smooth decision-making process and representation 
due to the topic being non-controversial.  
The outcome of the Nagoya negotiations largely reflected the EU’s position, the 
only important concession being the inclusion of derivatives, leading to a high level of 
effectiveness. Additionally, the EU also gained the prestige of a diplomatic victory by 
being a key actor during the conference. Nevertheless, it should be noted that within 
the actorness framework, the ‘opportunity’ variable arguably provides the largest 
explanatory power. The EU’s position was conservative compared to that of other 
countries, particularly developing countries, and therefore easier to defend. 
Moreover, the EU’s importance during the negotiations was a direct consequence of 
the absence of the US. Without the American market share of 40% in patent 
applications, the EU represented about half of the market that could potentially still 
be covered by a possible agreement.69 Also, the emerging economies were not in a 
strong position, as they had difficulties finding a balance between protecting their 
biodiversity and defending the interests of industries using genetic resources.70 The 
high effectiveness of the EU was thus mainly the consequence of the non-participation 
of the US, which resulted in the Union’s market share becoming key to the negotiations 
and allowed the EU to take on a more conservative position compared to other 
countries. 
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The Paris Agreement: A united and effective EU 
Despite the increasing involvement of citizens’ organisations and other international 
institutions such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the UNFCCC is 
still the main framework in which global climate negotiations take place – as 
evidenced by the political and media attention for COP-21 in Paris in 2015. The 
cleavage created by the Kyoto Protocol between industrialised and developing 
countries was still present. However, since COP-15 in Copenhagen, several coalitions 
in favour of measures combatting climate change united developed and developing 
countries. For example, the Durban Coalition consisting of vulnerable states and small 
islands worked together with the EU to re-energise climate talks in the aftermath of 
COP-15.71 In a 2014 bilateral Sino-American agreement, the US and China recognised 
the danger of climate change and the need to reduce GHG emissions. These 
agreements boosted the confidence of the negotiators and helped to create 
momentum ahead of COP-21.72 Differences in positions still existed, with the EU being 
closer to developing countries concerning the level of GHG emission reduction and 
transparency, but more aligned with industrialised nations regarding climate finance 
and measures dealing with the effects of climate change. Moreover, the EU’s 
proposed internal climate measures were relatively ambitious, but not sufficient to limit 
global warming to the often mentioned 2°C target. The US was opposed to legally 
binding reduction targets, due to domestic opposition, and China was hesitant to 
accept transparent review mechanisms.73 Despite these differences, the level of trust 
was significantly higher than in Copenhagen and several coalitions between 
industrialised and developing countries had built clear momentum, contributing to  
high ‘opportunity’. 
 Despite significant problems and reform attempts, the ETS was still seen as an 
example by other countries, contributing to the EU’s ‘presence’. The idea of creating 
a worldwide carbon market, mirroring or based on the ETS has been actively promoted 
by EU officials.74 Furthermore, the EU also actively used its ‘presence’ through the ETS 
as a tool to advance the discussions in the ICAO to limit emissions from international 
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aviation.75 Additionally, it was largely on track to attain its 2020 targets, allowing it to 
back up its international rhetoric. Finally, the EU adopted concrete policy measures 
such as investments in electricity grid connectivity in order to operationalise its 2030, 
2040 and 2050 (interim) targets. Even though the EU will have to significantly increase 
its efforts to attain these long-term targets, the adoption of these objectives had a 
positive influence on the EU’s ‘presence’, as several countries saw this as a positive 
example. 76  Together with the other aspects, this resulted in a high level of EU 
‘presence’.  
Even though combatting climate change is now explicitly mentioned as a 
Treaty objective, it remains a shared competence. Nevertheless, the unanimity 
requirement in the Council never proved problematic due to an early political 
package deal in the European Council. Also within the European Parliament there was 
broad support for the negotiations. This consensual decision-making led to a coherent 
representation, with a workable division of labour between the Council Presidency 
and the Commission. The Commission’s outreach ahead of the Paris summit was 
complemented by high-level diplomacy by, among others, France and Germany. This 
joint effort on different levels culminated in the EU playing a key role in the creation of 
the High Ambition Coalition. This coalition united key players such as the EU, the US, 
Brazil and many African, Caribbean and Pacific states, and it proved to be the 
necessary breakthrough for the conclusion of the Paris Agreement.77 Despite the extra 
hurdle that resulted from the complexity of the negotiations, the EU’s position was 
rather coherent and the process of defending it went smoothly, meaning that the EU’s 
‘capability’ was high. 
With high ‘opportunity’, ‘presence’ and ‘capability’, the EU’s overall actorness 
was high during COP-21. Important cleavages still existed and somewhat limited the 
EU’s opportunity, such as the one between the EU and developing countries versus the 
US regarding legally binding emission reduction targets, or between industrialised and 
developing countries regarding climate finance. However, this constraint was more 
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than compensated by the rather clear international structure, the EU’s comprehensive 
internal legislation and the convergence of EU member state positions. 
Whether or not the Paris Agreement is indeed a major breakthrough for the fight 
against climate change remains to be seen, but the negotiations are nevertheless 
considered to be a success for the EU. The final agreement includes most of the EU’s 
positions, such as a transparent review mechanism, with concessions only with regard 
to the binding nature of GHG emission reduction targets. The ‘opportunity’ variable is 
again the most important factor to explain the high level of EU effectiveness. First, the 
EU’s position at COP-21 became more moderate and therefore easier to defend in 
comparison to COP-15. Second, other key players had become more willing to 
conclude a global climate agreement, in particular the US and China after the 2014 
Sino-American climate agreement. This led to a much more favourable international 
constellation for the EU. The role of the French COP Presidency should also not be 
underestimated. It was well aware of the EU’s institutional set-up, and related 
problems, and managed to neutralise potential critics such as Poland by actively 
involving them in the negotiations.78 The EU’s success can thus largely be explained by 
the more favourable international conditions, rather than by the EU’s internal politics. 
The Nagoya Protocol and Paris negotiations confirm the findings of the pre-
Lisbon cases, namely the predominance of the external context to explain the EU’s 
effectiveness. The next section further develops the comparison between the four 
cases. 
 
Was the Lisbon Treaty a game changer? 
As demonstrated by the quote regarding COP-15 at the beginning of this paper, 
former Commissioner for Climate Action Hedegaard saw ‘singing from the same hymn 
sheet’ as the solution to avoid another international conference where disunity would 
result in the EU being side-lined. By streamlining the EU’s representation, this is exactly 
what the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty attempted to do. The following 
sections reflect on whether the Lisbon Treaty has indeed led to an increased actorness 
and effectiveness of the EU, and whether there are important differences between 
the fields of climate change and biodiversity. 
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More actorness and effectiveness thanks to Lisbon? 
To what extent and how has the Lisbon Treaty strengthened the EU’s actorness and 
effectiveness? The overview in Table 3 shows no clear change between the two time 
periods. The ‘capability’ and ‘presence’ variables are medium for all cases except for 
COP-21, and the overall actorness follows the same pattern.  
Indeed, some of the changes by the Lisbon Treaty have had little effect in 
practice. The Lisbon Treaty included a specific reference to climate change as an 
external policy objective and several environment-related competences like transport 
and energy now use the ordinary legislative procedure.79 This can result in an easier 
decision-making process and therefore in higher ‘capability’. So far, however, the 
negotiations that have been conducted after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
have resulted in mixed agreements, and therefore they needed to be adopted by 
unanimity. This clearly makes the threshold for internal decision-making more difficult 
to reach. As a result, it limits the EU’s ‘capability’. This limitation is more important than 
the increase of power for the European Parliament, as the case studies show that the 
inclusion of the Parliament as an additional veto player has not had a significant 
impact on the EU’s ‘capability’. The case studies that were discussed proved to be 
non-controversial and the EU’s position was broadly supported. 
The score of all actorness variables was high for COP-21, as shown in Table 3 
below. As discussed in the case studies, it was the good working relationship between 
the Council Presidency and the Commission, together with the high-level political 
compromise in the European Council, that mainly led to a high ‘capability’. The high 
level of ‘presence’ was the result of the adoption of internal legislation that 
progressively corresponded to the EU’s ambitious international rhetoric. The high 
scores for these actorness variables are thus the result of politics and incremental 
policy-making, not of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. 
The changes regarding the EU’s representation have also not had much impact 
in practice. While the Council Conclusions on climate diplomacy specifically mention 
the HR/VP as a key player when it comes to the coordination of the EU’s climate efforts, 
this is not the case in practice. 80 The case studies show that the main roles are reserved 
for the Commission and the Council Presidency. Indeed, the representation of the EU 
still follows the same pattern as in the pre-Lisbon period. This is somewhat surprising, 
considering the absence of any explicit mentioning of the Council Presidency in the 
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EU Treaties. This did not change under the Belgian Council Presidency, at the time of 
the Nagoya negotiations, although its ambition was to give the EEAS, the HR/VP and 
the European Council President ‘carte blanche’ and “to make sure that the working 
presidency no longer [had] anything to do with external relations by the end of the 
term”.81 This ambition was not put into practice though, and the coherence of the EU’s 
representation – one of the criteria for ‘capability’ – therefore still depends on informal, 
ad hoc arrangements.  
 
Table 3: Overview of EU actorness and effectiveness in MEA negotiations 
Variables Pre-Lisbon Post-Lisbon 
 Cartagena COP-15 Nagoya COP-21 
Opportunity H L H H 
Presence M M M H 
Capability M M M H 
Actorness M M M H 
Effectiveness H L H H 
Source: compiled by author. 
The Cartagena and Nagoya negotiations have shown that it is impossible to distinguish 
between member states’ national competences and EU competences, and that it is 
necessary for the Commission to involve national experts to avoid backlashes. As a 
consequence, the use of a workable EU team consisting of Commission and national 
experts continues to be important in order for the negotiations to be conducted 
smoothly. However, the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty did not have any 
impact on this practical working arrangement – and thus on the EU’s ‘capability’.  
Based on a comparison of the two time periods, there is little evidence that the 
Lisbon Treaty has significantly strengthened the EU’s actorness in the field of MEA 
negotiations. The Council Presidency still represents the EU together with the 
Commission, and the decision-making process still requires unanimity among member 
states. The improvement in ‘capability’ that can be observed in Paris and Nagoya in 
comparison with Copenhagen and Cartagena was indeed the result of political 
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considerations leading to policy convergence, and not so much of the Lisbon Treaty. 
In fact, the case studies show that the member states are usually able to overcome 
policy differences – with the notable exception of COP-15. This process is strengthened 
by the EU policy that is already in place internally, which then serves as a basis and 
helps to create a more coherent position in external negotiations. The slow and 
incremental process of everyday internal policy-making combined with ad hoc 
practical negotiation arrangements seem to be more important for external policy 
convergence than major Treaty changes. 
The Lisbon Treaty has also not strengthened the EU’s effectiveness. While Table 3 
shows a higher effectiveness for the two post-Lisbon cases, the pre-Lisbon COP-15 case 
had a very low level of effectiveness. However, as discussed in the case studies, the 
variation of the effectiveness level largely depends on external factors, such as the 
position of other key players and the EU’s relative importance for the global regime. 
All these factors are reflected in the ‘opportunity’ variable of actorness and Table 3 
shows that there is a clear correlation with the levels of effectiveness. The Lisbon Treaty 
did not influence the global context or the position of other players, meaning that it 
had little impact on the EU’s level of effectiveness. 
 
The EU’s role in biodiversity versus climate change negotiations 
The comparative framework consisting of four case studies also allows for comparisons 
between the fields of biodiversity and climate change. The EU has been more 
influential in the field of biodiversity than it has been in climate change. Indeed, as 
Table 4 shows, the levels of effectiveness in the biodiversity regime have been high for 
both case studies. The pattern for both biodiversity case studies is identical, namely a 
combination of medium actorness and high effectiveness. The case studies from the 
climate change regime, however, show more variation, with both low and high levels 
of effectiveness and different scores for the actorness variables.  
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Table 4: Overview of EU actorness and effectiveness in MEA negotiations 
Variables Biodiversity Climate change 
 Cartagena Nagoya COP-15 COP-21 
Opportunity H H L H 
Presence M M M H 
Capability M M M H 
Actorness M M M H 
Effectiveness H H L H 
Source: compiled by author. 
As explained in the previous section, the largest explanatory power for the EU’s 
effectiveness is provided by the ‘opportunity’ variable. This indeed essentially explains 
why the EU is more effective in the biodiversity than in the climate change regime. Two 
main reasons can be identified in this regard. First, the case studies have shown that 
the EU’s position vis-à-vis other key players in climate change has been rather reformist, 
particularly at COP-15. Conversely, its viewpoints in the biodiversity negotiations were 
more conservative, particularly in the Nagoya case. This makes its position much more 
powerful. The stronger stance that comes with not being the ‘demandeur’ of an 
agreement is further strengthened by the international power constellation. As 
described earlier, the non-participation of the US made the EU a key partner for 
countries seeking an agreement during the Nagoya negotiations. Given that the US 
share of 40% of patent applications would not be covered by the Nagoya Protocol, 
the EU’s 30% market share was essential for the final agreement to have a real impact. 
Together with the fact that the EU was able to somewhat adjust its positions in both 
Cartagena and Nagoya, also because the issues were less controversial internally, this 
resulted in a high level of goal achievement. The situation is very different in the climate 
change negotiations. The EU is among the main ‘demandeurs’ of international action, 
while its participation is not as essential anymore for an agreement as it used to be. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen what the situation will be when the US leaves the 
Paris Agreement, as announced by President Trump.82 
                                                 
82 Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord”, 
The White House, Washington, DC, 1 June 2017. 
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Conclusion: The Lisbon Treaty leading to more of the same 
Inspired by recent literature, this paper analysed to what extent and how the Lisbon 
Treaty had the expected positive influence on the EU’s actorness and whether this had 
in turn affected the EU’s effectiveness or goal achievement. In doing so, the paper 
aimed to understand whether and how the EU’s (in)effectiveness in international 
negotiations is linked to its internal (dis)unity. Such a connection was, for example, 
made by former Climate Commissioner Hedegaard. In order to answer the question 
whether the Lisbon Treaty was really a game changer in the way the EU negotiates 
MEAs, a comparative case study of two pre- and two post-Lisbon cases was set up, 
for each period drawing on the examples of biodiversity and climate change. 
This study found varying levels of actorness and effectiveness, namely medium 
actorness in the Cartagena and Nagoya negotiations paired with high effectiveness, 
while the same level of actorness led to the EU being side-lined in Copenhagen. The 
post-Lisbon case of the Paris Agreement resulted in high levels of actorness and 
effectiveness. However, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the Lisbon 
Treaty has had a significant impact on the EU’s actorness. Political considerations and 
incremental internal policy-making seem more important for the EU’s ‘capability’ and 
‘presence’ than the institutional changes implemented by the Lisbon Treaty.  
Furthermore, there is little evidence for a direct link between the EU’s internal 
legal and political context and its external effectiveness. To the contrary, the external 
context, such as the international power constellation and the EU’s relative position in 
comparison with that of other countries, are much more important to explain the 
varying levels of EU goal achievement. As a consequence, one can conclude that 
the Lisbon Treaty had little effect on the EU’s level of goal achievement. This conclusion 
fits within a more recent wave of literature, which considers external factors to be more 
important to explain varying levels of EU effectiveness than internal capabilities.  
This also explains the difference in the EU’s level of goal achievement in the field 
of climate change versus biodiversity negotiations. Even though the EU’s internal 
climate policies during COP-15 and COP-21 were much better developed than its 
policies on genetic resources at the time of the Nagoya negotiations, the EU was 
arguably much more influential in the latter context. The EU’s power in this policy 
domain can primarily be derived from the non-participation of the US, which made EU 
support an absolute necessity for an agreement to have a real impact. Moreover, its 
position was rather conservative and it was not a ‘demandeur’ of the negotiations, 
which resulted in the need for other countries to accommodate EU demands. Its 
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objectives were still moderate enough, however, for the negotiations to be successful. 
More than anything else, the ‘opportunity’ variable seems to be the main explanatory 
factor for effectiveness, while ‘capability’ and ‘presence’ are less important.  
Considering the differences regarding the international biodiversity and climate 
change regimes, conclusions based on the analysis of climate summits cannot 
necessarily be generalised to all areas of MEA studies. Further research is needed on 
MEA negotiations other than climate change, so as to gain a better and more 
comprehensive picture of the EU’s role in this field. For example, the ozone regime, 
global chemicals governance or international water governance could serve as 
additional case studies. These cases could also be used to evaluate the conclusions 
of this paper. More broadly speaking, future research using the concept of actorness 
in order to understand the EU’s performance in external relations should give sufficient 
weight to the external context and thus the ‘opportunity’ variable. Only by including 
the external context can failures and successes of the EU in international negotiations 
be explained – and, based on that, recommendations be made to policy makers. 
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